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Abstract
We theorize that female candidates considering CEO roles will perceive greater termination
vulnerability in such roles than their male counterparts. We further theorize that indicators of
recent organizational distress will exacerbate female CEO candidates’ perceptions of
termination vulnerability, while the presence of female leaders will mitigate these concerns. To
test our arguments, we examine the initial values of newly appointed female and male CEOs’
severance agreements from 2007 to 2014. Results support our arguments and begin to shed light
on the factors that influence female executives’ concerns about CEO roles and ultimately firms’
ability to appoint female CEOs.
Keywords: gender; CEOs; severance agreements; inequality; board of directors
Women are underrepresented at the CEO level, particularly in the most prominent U.S. firms. This disparity has long
been attributed to the glass ceiling effect, or the invisible external barriers that restrict women from advancing into
top corporate roles (Hymowitz & Schellhardt, 1986). However, in recent years, opportunities to progress to the upper
echelon (UE) have opened for women, suggesting that the external barriers preventing women from advancing to the
executive ranks may be slowly receding. Indeed, over the last two decades, the proportion of female CEOs in S&P
500 firms has increased from less than one percent to five percent (Catalyst, 2018).
Despite this progress, the number of female CEOs remains low: “fewer large companies are run by women than by
men named John” (Wolfers, 2015). Addressing this point, some have advanced a new explanation for the scarcity of
women in the UE -- the “opt-out revolution” hypothesis, which proposes that women are deliberately choosing not to
pursue the very top executive positions (Belkin, 2003; Hoobler, Lemmon, & Wayne, 2014). For example, Gino and
colleagues (2015) argued and found that, in general, although women find upper-level positions as equally attainable
as their male counterparts, they view those positions as less desirable. Likewise, the results of a recent survey revealed
that while 64 percent of men aspire to obtain top executive roles, only 36 percent of women seek those same positions
(Bellstrom, 2015). A recent Fortune article discussing the appointment of Susan Cameron as CEO of Reynolds
American noted, “Cameron had no desire… to ever move up to CEO. (This is a stunningly common trait on the
Fortune Most Powerful Women list; CEOs Ginni Rometty of IBM and Ellen Kullman of DuPont, among others,
almost passed on promotions early in their careers, only to be pushed to lean in by their bosses or husbands.)” (Sellers,
2014). Most recently, some evidence appears to support women’s trepidations about taking the CEO role, as Gupta
and colleagues (in press) showed that female CEOs are significantly more vulnerable to termination than male CEOs.
Although many women may be opting-out of CEO roles, some clearly are opting-in. However, given that UE scholars
have paid little attention to the factors which female executives may deem important as they consider CEO roles, we
know little about what drives their concerns about taking on those top roles, or how firms seeking to hire a female
CEO might attempt to overcome those concerns. Admittedly, until very recently, the sheer scarcity of female CEOs
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has limited scholars’ ability to examine gender in the UE. However, the recent increase (albeit somewhat small) in the
number of female CEO appointments provides a novel opportunity to examine the contexts that affect female
executives’ concerns about accepting CEO roles -- which has implications for firms’ ability to appoint female CEOs.
In this study, we address these questions by integrating gender role (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman,
2012; Oliver, Krause, Busenbark, & Kalm, 2018) and UE research (Almazan & Suarez, 2003; Cadman, Campbell, &
Klasa, 2016; Cowen, King, & Marcel, 2016; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Rau & Xu, 2013). Prior work
has shown that “gender biases, stereotypes and male-typed leadership schemas shape global normative expectations
about women’s ability to lead and undermine the success of women in leadership roles” (Dwivedi, Joshi, & Misangyi,
2018: 3). Thus, women are likely to anticipate biased treatment and evaluations in top executive roles (Barbulescu &
Bidwell, 2013; Ragins, Townsend, & Mattis, 1998). Building on this research, we argue that, in general, female
candidates considering CEO roles will perceive greater vulnerability to termination in such roles than their male
counterparts. In addition, we expand our theorizing to argue that important contingencies will increase or decrease
those perceptions of termination vulnerability.
We test our arguments by examining the initial severance agreements of newly appointed female and male CEOs.
Initial severance agreements are negotiated between CEO candidates and boards of directors prior to appointment,
and specify the payments and benefits owed to CEOs if they are terminated. These agreements can reduce some of
the future compensation and employment risk CEOs perceive from potential involuntary termination (Almazan &
Suarez, 2003; Cowen et al., 2016).1 In this way, severance agreements function as a form of termination insurance for
CEO candidates, “easing concerns that might otherwise prevent a mutually beneficial employment relationship”
(Cowen et al., 2016: 155). Accordingly, guaranteed severance pay should reflect the termination risk that CEO
candidates perceive prior to appointment.
Our results support our arguments and, thus, make several important contributions. First of all, we contribute to the
emerging literature examining the factors that affect female CEO appointments (Cook & Glass, 2014; 2015; Ryan &
Haslam, 2007; Zhang & Qu, 2016). We find that female CEOs tend to receive larger initial severance agreements than
male CEOs. This suggests that women perceive greater termination vulnerability from accepting CEO appointments
than do male CEOs, which has important implications for boards. Specifically, boards seeking to hire female CEOs
may need to address their heightened concerns about termination, which can lead women to “opt-out” of such roles.
Our results suggest that guaranteed severance pay can be effective in this regard, by insuring CEOs against termination
losses. Although prior severance research has acknowledged the benefit of using severance agreements as a
recruitment tool (Cowen et al., 2016), very little empirical work has shown support for this argument (Klein,
McSweeney, Devers, McNamara, & Blosser, 2017). Thus, our findings also extend the severance literature (Rau &
Xu, 2013; Cowen et al., 2016), and suggest that severance agreements can be viewed as an especially effective
recruitment tool for female CEO candidates.
Second, we explore how factors related to female CEO candidates’ termination vulnerability can exacerbate or
attenuate gender-based termination concerns (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Zhang, 2008; Zhang & Qu,
2016). We show that the difference in severance agreements between incoming female and male CEOs is larger in
firms experiencing declining performance or where the prior CEO was dismissed early, and smaller in firms with at
least one female director or that operate in an industry with more female CEOs. These results suggest that female CEO
candidates’ concerns about biased treatment are heightened when considering joining firms encountering
organizational distress, and reduced when other female leaders are present, whether on the firm’s board or as CEOs
in its industry. Thus, our findings help extend our understanding of the specific conditions that seem to exacerbate and
alleviate women’s perceptions of biased treatment, rather than simply insuring them against termination losses as
severance agreements do. Together, these findings have the potential to advance the conversation about gender in the
UE, by providing some preliminary evidence that the perceptions and preferences of female leaders are more nuanced
and complex than prevailing views allow for.
Third, in additional supplementary findings, we show that both the total compensation and pay mix (variable versus
cash-based pay) of male and female CEOs are statistically indistinguishable -- at least in our sample, incoming male
and female CEOs receive comparable compensation, ceteris paribus. However, our results do show the guaranteed
severance pay that female CEOs receive in their initial contracts is significantly higher than male CEOs’. This suggests
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that, although female CEOs are, on average, able to secure greater severance guarantees, they do not appear to be
trading cash-based or incentive-based pay for severance. Rather, these results suggest that female CEO candidates
may have previously unrecognized bargaining power in the employment negotiation process.2
Theory and Hypotheses
CEO candidates face significant risk when considering CEO roles due to the potential for termination. Indeed, there
is much ambiguity regarding the demands of CEOs’ jobs (Allgood & Farrell, 2003; Zhang, 2008), as the typical
objective metrics by which CEOs are evaluated (i.e., accounting and stock performance) fail to accurately reflect
early-stage CEO performance (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Graffin, Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).
As a consequence, stakeholders must often rely on ambiguous and subjective information when evaluating recently
appointed CEOs (Graffin et al., 2013; Holmstrom, 1982; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006). When executives
are considering a CEO role, the possibility of termination and the subsequent adverse effects on financial, human, and
social capital can create high perceptions of employment and compensation risk (Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, GomezMejia, & Welbourne, 2007; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008). Specifically, dismissed CEOs often face
reputational damage (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Semadeni, Cannella, Fraser, & Lee, 2008), devaluation in the labor
market, and ultimately costs to their future job prospects and pay (Fama, 1980; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Wiesenfeld
et al., 2008). Some evidence indicates that fewer than 12 percent of CEOs who are dismissed subsequently find new
positions in public companies at any level; these jobs tend to be at smaller firms, with a lower compensation (Chang,
Hayes, & Hillegeist, 2016; Fee & Hadlock, 2004).
While all executives considering CEO roles are likely to be (at least) somewhat concerned about termination, evidence
suggests that women perceive even greater personal and professional threats associated with accepting these roles than
their male peers. For example, Ragins et al. (1998) surveyed 1,251 Fortune 1000 female executives about the strategies
that contributed to their career advancement: they found the overwhelming majority believed that in order to be
successful, they must exceed performance expectations and act in ways that won’t threaten their male coworkers or
make them feel uncomfortable. Likewise, recent studies show that female executives anticipate more negative
outcomes from high-level positions (Gino et al., 2015), and are thus less interested than men in becoming top
executives, because they perceive those roles as “disproportionately stressful” (LeanIn.Org & McKinsey & Company,
2015).
Considerable gender role research indicates that the heightened challenges that female executives face largely stem
from the inconsistencies between the characteristics that observers expect leaders to exhibit and those they expect
from women (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2012). Specifically, prior work demonstrates that people tend to
associate leaders with agentic qualities, such as assertiveness, aggressiveness, independence, and confidence (Koenig,
Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011; Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, & Bongiorno, 2011; Schein, 1973). This association is
problematic for women because, although people generally expect men to exhibit agentic qualities, they largely expect
women to exhibit communal qualities, such as compassion, nurturance, kindness, sensitivity, and caregiving (Bakan,
1966; Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Eagly, 1987). The resulting inconsistency often causes female leaders who exhibit
agentic behaviors to be seen as violating their stereotypical communal gender role, whereas those who demonstrate
communal behaviors are seen as lacking the agentic qualities expected of successful leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002;
Heilman, 1983; 1995; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Rudman & Glick, 2001). This leads observers to judge male leaders
as more effective than female leaders, even under similar performance levels (Heilman, 2012; Koenig et al., 2011),
which can undermine the success of female leaders, particularly those in executive-level roles (Dwivedi et al., 2018).
In support, Bigelow and colleagues (2014) demonstrated that external observers presume female CEOs are less
capable than male CEOs during IPOs, even when they have the same qualifications and manage similar firms.
Similarly, Lee and James (2007) and Jeong and Harrison (2017) showed that the market responds more negatively to
female CEO appointments than to male CEO appointments. Other research indicates that female CEOs are more likely
to be blamed for their missteps than their male counterparts, causing them to face greater negative media coverage
and damage to their reputations (Park & Westphal, 2013). Most recently, Gupta and colleagues (in press) found that
female CEOs are more likely to be terminated than male CEOs, ceteris paribus. Finally, anecdotal evidence offers
additional support for these findings. For example, Indra Nooya, who stepped down as PepsiCo’s CEO in 2018 stated,
“When you become a C.E.O. and you’re a woman, you are looked at differently… You are held to a different standard.
There’s no question about it” (Kolhatkar, 2018).
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Although female executives have overcome many constraints related to gender bias and male-type leadership schemas
to reach their positions, stepping into a CEO position is often considered a big leap for executives because the CEO
role differs substantially from any other executive role. Indeed, it is widely believed that the CEO position requires
agentic qualities and behavior, which is most inconsistent with the traditional female gender role and leads to
downwardly biased evaluations of the performance of a woman in such a leadership position (Eagly & Karau, 2002;
Jeong & Harrison, 2017). CEOs are also subjected to heightened visibility and exposure (Graffin et al., 2013; Kesner
& Sebora, 1994; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004): the CEO is inescapably perceived as the leader of the firm, which
again conflicts with the female gender role, and can result in significant career penalties for those who are deemed
unsuccessful. Based on this research, we theorize that female executives perceive greater termination vulnerability
when considering CEO positions compared to male executives.
CEO Gender-Based Perceptions of Termination Vulnerability and Severance
In this study, we consider the initial severance agreements granted to incoming female and male CEOs. Initial CEO
severance agreements are negotiated between boards and CEO candidates prior to appointment, and specify the
payments and benefits promised to CEOs upon termination. The severance payments these agreements promise are
far from trivial. For example, for incoming CEOs in our sample, annual salary, which many argue is the safest form
of compensation, averages approximately $700,000, whereas guaranteed severance pay averages $4.3 million.
Although CEOs and directors often face criticism over severance agreements (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Dash, 2007),
advocates argue that such agreements offer several important benefits related to CEO succession (Almazan & Suarez,
2003; Cowen et al., 2016). Specifically, as stated above, when executives are considering a CEO offer, the threat of
dismissal can generate high perceptions of employment and compensation risk (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007). The
greater the perceptions of this risk, the more likely it is that qualified candidates will decline CEO offers. Scholars
have argued that severance agreements can provide some insurance against involuntary termination for CEO
candidates, thus mitigating the personal cost of termination (Cadman et al., 2016; Cowen et al., 2016; Lys, Rusticus,
& Sletten, 2007; van Dalsam, 2010). Accordingly, severance agreements can help CEO candidates commit to a
position that may otherwise be perceived as presenting too much termination risk. By offering termination-related
insurance to potential CEOs and facilitating directors’ ability to attract CEO candidates who may have reservations
about joining their firms, severance agreements can serve the interests of both CEO candidates and boards.3 Building
on this work, we argue that the value of incoming CEOs’ severance agreements should reflect the level of termination
risk they associate with those positions.
Previous research suggests that, due to inherent gender bias and male-type leadership schemas, female executives
perceive greater vulnerability to termination when accepting CEO roles than their male counterparts. Since a severance
agreement is the only instrument that pays off if and only if the CEO is terminated, it is by definition the most efficient
compensation-related instrument to alleviate termination-based concerns (see Cowen et al., 2016; Ju, Leland, &
Senbet, 2014; Rau & Xu, 2013). By contrast, the components of an executive’s annual compensation package, such
as salary and stock option pay, are only granted as long as the CEO is still in office,4 and play other purposes than
insuring the CEO against termination risk. As a result, we believe that severance agreements will be especially useful
in addressing the heightened termination concerns of female CEO candidates.
Qualitative evidence provides preliminary support for the idea that severance agreements will tend to be more valuable
for incoming female CEOs than incoming male CEOs. For example, Apple’s 2015 proxy statement stated, “Aside
from the arrangement with Ms. Ahrendts [Senior VP for Retail and Online], which was offered to encourage her to
join the Company, the Company does not generally enter into severance arrangements with its named executive
officers…” (Apple Inc., 2015: 48). Likewise, Johnson and Johnson’s 2013 proxy statement suggests that they offered
their only female top management team executive, Ms. Peterson [Group Worldwide Chairman], an agreement when
she first entered the company that was different from the other top executives (Johnson & Johnson, 2013: 70).
Consequently, we propose that guaranteed severance pay will be larger for incoming female rather than incoming
male CEOs. Thus:
Hypothesis 1: All else equal, the value of female CEOs’ initial severance agreements will tend to
exceed that of male CEOs’.
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Gender-Based Contingencies in Perceptions of Termination Vulnerability
With our first hypothesis, we proposed that female CEO candidates perceive higher termination vulnerability than
their male counterparts. In this section, we explore the contextual factors that could exacerbate or attenuate female
candidates’ perceptions of vulnerability in CEO roles compared to male candidates.
First, UE scholars have argued that declining firm performance and early dismissal of the prior CEO, or “recent
organizational distress”, make CEOs more vulnerable to dismissal in the early years of their tenure (Fredrickson et
al., 1988, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman 2013; Zhang, 2008). Building on this work and on role congruity theory,
we argue that these factors exacerbate female CEO candidates’ termination concerns compared to male CEO
candidates. Second, scholars have argued that women are less vulnerable to biased treatment in CEO roles when other
women are present (Oliver et al., 2018; Zhang & Qu, 2016). In fact, Valian (1998: 323) argued that one of the most
effective ways for women leaders “to evade the negative consequences of gender schemas and accumulate advantage”
is to “try to work in fields and organizations where women are well-represented.” Extending this work, we propose
that the presence of female leaders on the firm’s board and as other CEOs in the firm’s industry will attenuate female
CEO candidates’ termination concerns compared to male CEO candidates.
Recent Organizational Distress. A priori, we would expect CEO candidates to be concerned about termination when
considering a firm with recent organizational distress; however, we argue below that women’s termination concerns
will be heightened compared to men’s due to stereotypes about gender and leadership.
First, we consider the moderating effect of performance decline at the firm where the CEO is appointed. One of the
most important predictors of CEO termination is poor firm performance (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Frederickson et
al., 1988; Gilson, 1989; Kaplan & Minton, 2012; Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993). Thus, CEO candidates are likely
sensitive to signals of performance decline and look for such markers when evaluating CEO offers. In particular,
scholars have argued that if a firm has had a consistent performance decline, it will be very hard for a new CEO to
turn it around (Chen, 2015). For example, Barker and Patterson (1996) showed that only about 30 percent of declining
organizations actually achieve turnaround. This is because a firm’s downward spiral tends to be persistent (Hambrick
& D’Aveni, 1988; 1992). Thus, compared to healthy firms, declining firms often face a high risk of failure (Jiang,
Cannella, Xia, & Semadeni, 2017). If a firm fails during a CEO’s tenure, even if the problems were inherited from the
predecessor, the CEO may be viewed as personally responsible (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Semadeni
et al., 2008). Admittedly, accepting a CEO role at a declining firm could be appealing to some CEO candidates given
that turning around the firm’s fortune can result in the CEO making a name for him/herself and gaining significant
prestige (Chen, 2015). However, the likelihood of this occurring is very low (Bibeault, 1982; Chen & Hambrick,
2012). Thus, CEO candidates are likely to perceive a heightened possibility of termination when considering a position
at a declining firm (Chang et al., 2016).
While all CEO candidates may be apprehensive about joining a firm on a declining performance trend, female CEOs
are likely to be more concerned. This is because a man’s competence is often assumed in leadership roles whereas a
woman’s competence is generally questioned (Heilman 2001; 2012), consistent with role congruity research (Eagly
& Karau, 2002). In particular, when a woman makes a mistake, gender bias is heightened given “salient mistakes
create ambiguity,” and “stereotyping thrives on ambiguity” (Brescoll, Dawson, & Uhlmann, 2010: 1640).
Consequently, female CEOs often face greater blame for a firm’s poor performance than male CEOs (Brescoll et al.,
2010; Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, & Atkins, 2010), resulting in greater negative media coverage and
reputational damage for them (Park & Westphal, 2013). Recent evidence also shows that female CEOs tend to
encounter greater public displays of dissatisfaction from activist investors (Gupta, Han, Mortal, Silveri, & Turban,
2018), which matters to women considering a CEO position at firms on a declining trajectory since activist investors
have a stronger propensity to target poorly performing companies (Bethel, Liebeskind, & Opler, 1998).
In addition, a firm on a declining trajectory will often require decisive corrective actions, such as downsizing or
retrenchment (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989), which are often perceived as incongruent with the communal expectations
of the female gender role. As such, role congruity theory suggests such actions are likely to elicit more negative
evaluations for female CEOs than for male CEOs (Eagly & Karau, 2002). In sum, female CEO candidates will likely
perceive greater termination vulnerability when accepting CEO roles in firms with declining performance trends than
will male CEOs.
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By contrast, some male executives may even perceive benefits from being appointed CEO of a firm on a declining
performance trend, as this provides them with an opportunity to exhibit behaviors congruent with the male gender role
such as “forcefulness” and “assertiveness” (Eagly, 1987; Vandello & Bosson, 2013). Besides, even poor performance
by a male executive is less likely to be attributed to his ability as a leader, but instead to outside factors, such as bad
luck, market or industry conditions (Park & Westphal, 2013; Swim & Sanna, 1996). This suggests that male CEO
candidates will likely be less concerned about accepting a position at a firm with a declining performance trajectory
than female CEO candidates. Thus, we expect:
Hypothesis 2: The relation between gender and the value of CEOs’ initial severance agreements is
moderated by firm performance prior to CEO appointment, such that sustained declining
performance strengthens the positive relation between female CEO and severance value.
Second, we consider how the early termination of the previous CEO of the appointing firm may affect the relation
between CEO gender and initial severance agreements. Prior work has shown that new CEOs appointed to firms in
which the predecessor was dismissed, particularly in a short period of time following appointment, are especially
vulnerable to early dismissal (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Zhang, 2008). This is because the failure of these CEOs often
causes a firm to have to bypass the normal succession process, and select a new CEO in an unplanned manner, which
can aggravate an already disruptive process (Zhang & Qu, 2016: 1848). As Shen (2003:469) discussed, “dismissing
new CEOs before they can fully demonstrate their leadership potentials is not only a waste of executive talent but very
disruptive to the firm, because it hinders the establishment of reliable and predictable routines that are highly regarded
by inside and outside stakeholders (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).” Ultimately, this worsens the situation faced by their
successor (Shen & Cannella, 2002a), and increases the likelihood that he / she may also be dismissed (Zhang, 2008).
Thus, CEO candidates may view a prior CEO’s early dismissal as indicative of the challenges they will face at a firm
(Gillan, Hartzell, & Parrino, 2009). They could also view it as a signal of a “trigger happy board” that expects to see
results materialize quickly, or a board that is prone to terminate a CEO in response to negative short-term
organizational events (Shen, 2003). For all these reasons, the early dismissal of the prior CEO can heighten candidates’
concerns about termination when considering CEO roles.
Yet, female CEO candidates are likely to be more concerned than male CEO candidates about an early dismissal of
the prior CEO. While all new CEOs face a “liability of newness” leading to some disruption as the new CEO takes
over, a new female CEO is more disruptive given the rarity of women in such roles and the expectation that her
management style will differ from traditional (male) leaders (Ashcraft, 1999; Zhang & Qu, 2016). Recent evidence
indeed indicates that appointing a female CEO, especially after a predecessor departed early, “may amplify the
disruption of the CEO succession process and increase the challenges faced by the successor” (Zhang & Qu, 2016:
1862). Ultimately, this can make it harder for a woman to succeed in an already challenging role.
Furthermore, given role congruity bias, women often face greater skepticism regarding their fitness for CEO roles
(Eagly & Karau, 2002). Consistent with this argument, Jeong and Harrison (2017: 1226) argued that negative
stakeholder evaluations of female CEOs are likely to be “captured in short-term market returns, which largely reflect
investor beliefs and cognitions about future share price (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Schijven & Hitt, 2012), rather than
long-term financial returns to business operations.” In addition, female CEOs are more likely to take a strategic,
collaborative, and cautious approach, which should take more time to bear fruit, ultimately affecting long-term firm
performance rather than short-term performance (Jeong & Harrison, 2017; Ibarra & Obodaru, 2009). Thus, the early
dismissal of the previous CEO, which indicates that the firm’s board is likely looking for a quick turnaround and is
prone to forcefully respond to negative short-term signals and events by terminating a CEO (Zhang, 2008), may be
particularly concerning for women.
In contrast, we believe this effect will be weaker for male CEO candidates. First, men are already seen as leaders
(Eagly & Karau, 2002) and, in addition, the overwhelming majority of CEOs are men. Thus, the appointment of a
male CEO is more likely to be viewed as “normal”, creating less disruption for the firm (Zhang & Qu, 2016). Second,
when firms led by male CEOs experience negative events, those situations are likely to be attributed to external factors
and luck, rather than to the CEO (Park & Westphal, 2013; Swim & Sanna, 1996). Thus, male CEO candidates may be
more likely to believe that they will be given the benefit of the doubt by boards early in their tenure. Hence, we
propose:
Hypothesis 3: The relation between gender and the value of CEOs’ initial severance agreements is
moderated by the early dismissal of the prior CEO, such that an early dismissal strengthens the
positive relation between female CEO and severance value.
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Female Leader Presence. Prior research argues that the presence of female leaders in a firm’s environment should
decrease the biased treatment faced by a female CEO (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Oliver et al., 2018; Valian, 1998; Zhang
& Qu, 2016). Extending this work, we argue that the presence of female CEOs in the focal firm’s industry or on its
board of directors will reduce female candidates’ perceptions of termination vulnerability associated with accepting
CEO roles.
We first consider the moderating effect of female CEOs in the focal firm’s industry. Although observers tend to
associate the CEO position with the male gender role, evidence suggests that the presence of top female leaders can
begin to weaken gender and leader stereotypes (Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2009; Dasgupta
& Asgari, 2004; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Heilman & Caleo, 2018; Kwan, Yap, & Chiu,
2015). This is because exposure to female leaders can facilitate “updating of impressions based on new observations
(e.g., Weber and Crocker, 1983)” (Koenig et al., 2011: 4). Thus, in situations in which female leaders are more
prevalent, observers tend to ascribe more agentic qualities to women, and less masculine qualities to leaders, reducing
the incongruity between the female gender role and leadership roles (Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004; Diekman & Eagly,
2000; Duehr & Bono, 2006; Koenig et al., 2011). In turn, this can lead observers to view women as more suitable for
leadership roles (Beaman et al., 2009; Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004; Eagly & Carli, 2007; Kanter, 1977; Valian, 1998).
This work suggests that female CEO candidates should perceive that their gender will be less salient to evaluators in
industries with a larger presence of female CEOs than in male-dominated industries (Cook & Glass, 2011; Kanter,
1977; Koch, D’Mello, & Sackett, 2015), thereby mitigating female CEO candidates’ fear of negatively biased
treatment and evaluation. Some studies also suggest that new female CEOs should feel more comfortable and
supported in their roles in the presence of female peers (Ely, 1994; Kanter, 1977).5 Building on this work, we propose
that female CEO candidates will perceive lower termination vulnerability in industries where the presence of female
CEOs is higher. However, we do not believe that this factor will have a substantial effect on male CEO candidates’
termination concerns. This is because the overwhelming majority of CEOs are men (Catalyst, 2018). As a result, we
suggest that men are less prone to perceive role congruity related biases, especially at the current levels of female
CEOs, even in industries in which the proportion of women leaders is higher. Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 4: The relation between gender and the value of CEOs’ initial severance agreements is
moderated by the presence of female CEOs in the focal firm’s industry, such that a larger presence
of female CEOs weakens the positive relation between female CEO and severance value.
Last, we consider the moderating effect of female director presence. One of the main roles of a company’s board is to
appoint, oversee, and occasionally terminate the company’s executives (Matsa & Miller, 2011). We argued above that
the presence of female CEOs in the focal firm’s industry can reduce female candidates’ termination concerns as it
makes the gender of a new female CEO less salient to evaluators. Similar evidence indicates that female director
presence can decrease the likelihood of gender stereotyping against female CEOs (Oliver et al., 2018). This results
from the increased exposure and contact with female leaders (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Zhu & Westphal, 2014),
which signals that women are valued and can perform well in leadership roles at the firm (Zhang & Qu, 2016). In
addition, given their own experience with gender bias (Kulich, Trojanowski, Ryan, Haslam, & Renneboog, 2011;
Main & Gregory-Smith, 2018), female directors are likely more equipped to recognize any biased treatment female
CEOs may face, and to help them overcome such challenges (Cook & Glass, 2015; Matsa & Miller, 2011). This could
be achieved directly, via mentoring and sharing of information with the CEO (Amore, Garofalo, & Minichilli, 2014;
Cook & Glass, 2015), or more indirectly, by calling out biased treatment during board meetings. Prior evidence
supports the idea that female CEOs benefit from female directors’ presence, as it has been shown to improve the postsuccession profitability of female CEOs in family-controlled firms in Italy (Amore et al., 2014), and in Fortune 500
U.S. firms (Cook & Glass, 2015). Thus, we argue that female CEO candidates appointed to firms with female director
presence will likely perceive the potential of having a powerful ally on their side, and, thus, perceive less termination
vulnerability.
Together, the work discussed above suggests female director presence should alleviate female candidates’ termination
concerns in CEO roles. However, since the vast majority of board members are still men (Gupta et al., in press; Zhang
& Qu, 2016), we do not believe that female director presence at their current levels will substantially affect male CEO
candidates’ concerns. Indeed, they are unlikely to perceive that they will face role congruity bias, and thus be at a
disadvantage in a CEO role when a woman is present on the board. Thus, we predict:
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Hypothesis 5: The relation between gender and the value of CEOs’ initial severance agreements is
moderated by female director presence, such that the latter weakens the positive relation between
female CEO and severance value.
Methods
Data
We collected data from a variety of sources for this study. First, given that our study focuses on new CEO
appointments, we identified all new CEOs for all publicly traded U.S. firms during 2007 to 2014 using Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp database. We excluded any “interim” CEOs, similar to Oliver et al. (2018), as identified in
their titles. Given the imperfections of the ExecuComp database with regards to severance agreements documented in
Cadman et al. (2016), we searched for the proxy statement (DEF 14A) of each firm identified as having a new CEO,
and hand-coded their incoming CEO’s initial guaranteed severance dollar value for involuntary termination.
Specifically, we obtained each firm’s proxy statement from the SEC website. We then searched for guaranteed
severance pay information for each CEO and coded the total dollar value of guaranteed involuntary termination pay.
Some firms listed this data in a table; for these firms, we simply coded the value. When this information was not
directly provided, we calculated these values using text descriptions of guaranteed involuntary termination value and
compensation summary tables, as severance agreements are often based on a combination of different forms of total
compensation, including base salary, lump-sum cash, vested and unvested stock and stock options, insurance
coverage, pension plan acceleration, among other items (Zhao, 2013). Following Cadman et al. (2016), we did not
include already earned or already “vested” compensation (we subtracted these amounts from the total severance
value).
Firm- and individual-level characteristic variables were gathered from ExecuComp and Compustat, except for
governance data, which was gathered from RiskMetrics. Similar to previous studies on CEO dismissal (e.g., Cannella
& Lubatkin, 1993; Jenter & Kanaan, 2015; Shen & Cannella, 2002a, 2002b), we obtained news reports and press
releases surrounding early departures of CEOs to determine whether or not the CEO was dismissed. Given that our
sample only includes CEOs who were appointed between 2007 and 2014, our analysis is based on 870 observations.
Dependent Variable
We examined the guaranteed dollar values of severance payments contained in CEOs’ initial severance agreements
(negotiated at the time of appointment). We used the total dollar value of guaranteed severance pay for involuntary
termination collected from proxy statements, as specified in each incoming CEO’s initial severance agreement. For
CEOs without an agreement, we coded the value as zero, adding one before logging it. We then logged this measure,
as is commonly the case for executive compensation studies.
Independent Variable
The predictor variable in our study is CEO gender, coded as 1 for female and 0 for male.
Moderators
Declining Firm Performance. Similar to prior research, firms had to experience multiple years of declining firm
performance to be characterized as declining (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2003; Morrow, Johnson, & Busenitz, 2004;
Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Wiseman & Bromily, 1991). Specifically, we constructed a dummy variable that equals 1 if
return on equity (ROE) has declined for three consecutive years prior to CEO appointment, and 0 otherwise. The
hypothesized result for declining firm performance is robust to using return on assets (ROA) instead of ROE, and
operationalizing declining firm performance as four or five consecutive years of declining ROE prior to appointment
instead of three.
Early Dismissal of Prior CEO. In line with prior research, using news reports and press releases surrounding the
departure of the previous CEO, we defined the prior CEO as dismissed early if he or she was terminated within a short
period, defined as three years or less after appointment (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Zhang, 2008), and “all
officership and directorship connections between the firm and its outgoing CEO were severed at the time of
succession” (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993: 777). Specifically, we created a dummy variable equal to 1 if the outgoing
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CEO’s tenure was within one to three years, given that CEOs with tenure under one year are likely to be interim CEOs,
and all connections with the firm were cut off at the time of termination. We coded this variable as 0 if the prior CEO
did not depart early or if his / her tenure was below one year, or if the prior CEO remained connected to the firm after
termination, via directorship, officership, advisorship, or consulting positions, as mentioned in news reports or press
releases related to the CEO’s departure.
This definition of “dismissal” is particularly relevant to our study on female CEOs given the importance of a mentoring
and partnering relationship with the predecessor for a female CEO’s success (Dwivedi et al., 2018). In addition,
although the male gender role is often associated with independence, the female gender role is associated with
communal qualities. If the prior CEO is no longer involved, the new CEO becomes the sole (independent) leader of
the firm, thus potentially increasing perceptions of role incongruity. Last, we focus on “early” dismissal given that a
CEO dismissed after a long tenure could simply be a manifestation of the need for periodical renewal, as is the case
for example in CEO successions that involve an heir apparent (Cannella & Shen, 2001), which should not be especially
concerning to female CEO candidates.
Presence of Female CEOs in the Focal Firm’s Industry. This variable is defined as the proportion of female CEOs
in the industry in the prior year, based on the two-digit SIC code (Cook & Glass, 2011).
Female Director Presence. We operationalized female director presence as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there
is at least one female director on the board in the year prior to the CEO appointment, and equal to 0 otherwise, similar
to some previous studies (Geiler & Renneboog, 2015; Zhang & Qu, 2016).6
Controls
We included several CEO- and firm-level control variables that may influence CEOs’ initial severance agreements,
as identified by previous studies (e.g. Bodolica & Spraggon, 2009; Cadman et al., 2016; Rau & Xu, 2013). Because
initial severance agreements are negotiated at the time of CEO appointment, we lagged our firm-level controls. We
dropped all observations that were missing, resulting in our final sample of 870 observations.
Prior research has shown that firm risk is associated with the value of the severance agreement, given being employed
at a firm with greater risk is likely to increase one’s termination vulnerability (Cadman et al., 2016; Rau & Xu, 2013).
We used two common measures of firm risk: return volatility and leverage. Specifically, we controlled for return
volatility, defined as the lagged annualized standard deviation of the log of daily stock returns, multiplied by 252(1/2)
(Cadman et al., 2016), and firm leverage, defined as a firm’s lagged total liabilities divided by lagged liabilities plus
lagged stockholders’ equity. We also controlled for firm size using the natural logarithm of lagged total sales, because
it may be an important determinant of the use and size of severance agreements (Rau & Xu, 2013; Rusticus, 2006). In
addition, since better performing firms tend to offer higher pay (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001), we took into account firm
performance by controlling for the lagged three-year average of ROE (Cook & Glass, 2014). We also controlled for
industry performance, using the three-year industry (two-digit SIC code) average of ROE, and a stock measure of
performance by controlling for lagged total shareholder return.
Similar to past severance studies (e.g. Bodolica & Spraggon, 2009), we controlled for board independence using the
lagged proportion of independent board members. Because firms that pay more may offer higher guaranteed
severance, we also partialled out the effect of CEO compensation, using the natural logarithm of annual total pay
(TDC1), defined as the sum of salary, bonus, stock, stock options, non-equity incentive pay, deferred compensation
earnings, and other pay (Rau & Xu, 2013; Schwab & Thomas, 2006). Prior research has also shown that internal
appointees tend to receive smaller severance agreements than external appointees (Gillan et al., 2009; Rusticus, 2006).
Thus, we controlled for internal appointee, a dummy variable which equals 1 if the incoming CEO had been employed
by the firm for two years or more, and 0 otherwise (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Harris & Helfat, 1997). In addition,
younger CEOs tend to demand higher guaranteed severance pay: as they do not have an established track record, it is
more difficult for them to find a comparable job in case they are dismissed. Thus, we controlled for the effect of CEO
age (Rau & Xu, 2013). We also controlled for CEO duality (coded 1 if a new CEO also had the title of Chairman, and
0 otherwise), as this may decrease the likelihood of CEO dismissal (Zhang, 2008). Last, we included a control for
CEO ownership, defined as the lagged percentage of total shares outstanding held by the CEO, given that CEOs who
own less of the firm’s equity often have larger severance agreements (Cadman et al., 2016).7
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Analysis
To analyze the data, we standardized predictor variables, except for dichotomous variables, before creating the
interaction terms. Given the structure of our data, we used OLS models with year dummies and two-digit industry
clustering.8 However, our results are also robust to industry random-effects models. Variance inflation factor scores
indicated that multicollinearity was not an issue in any model, as all of those scores were below 5, and the mean scores
were below 2.
Results
Summary Statistics and Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all CEO appointments from 2007 to 2014. Approximately five percent of
incoming CEOs in our sample are women. Additionally, roughly 73 percent of incoming CEOs have a severance
agreement, with a mean guaranteed payment of $4.3 million and median of $1.9 million.
-----------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
---------------------------------Table 2 presents the results of the regressions used to test Hypotheses 1 through 5, controlling for standard
determinants of severance agreements. Model 1 includes only the control variables. In model 2, we examine the
influence of CEO gender on CEOs’ initial severance agreements by including the female dummy. The results indicate
that guaranteed severance payments tend to be larger for incoming female CEOs rather than incoming male CEOs (b
= 2.28, p = 0.001), supporting Hypothesis 1. Assessing the magnitude of this effect (based on model 2), the predicted
guaranteed severance pay is 5.2 million for incoming female CEOs, and 0.8 million for incoming male CEOs, all else
equal.
-----------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
-----------------------------------Models 3 - 6 present each interaction individually, and model 7 presents the test of our interaction hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that a firm’s declining performance would strengthen the positive relation between CEO
gender and guaranteed severance pay. The coefficient for the female dummy × declining firm performance interaction
term is positive in model 7 (b = 3.67, p = 0.002), consistent with Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 predicted that the early
dismissal of the prior CEO would also strengthen the relation between CEO gender and guaranteed severance pay.
We find support for this hypothesis (b = 2.50, p = 0.044).9 Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we find that the presence of
female CEOs in the focal firm’s industry prior to appointment weakens the relation between CEO gender and
guaranteed severance pay (b = -0.93, p = 0.025). Last, Hypothesis 5 predicted that female director presence prior to
appointment weakens the relation. We also find support for this hypothesis (b = -2.38, p = 0.024).
Finally, considering the economic significance of our moderators while controlling for other factors, the estimated
percentage increase in guaranteed severance pay for incoming female CEOs in firms with declining performance
(model 3) is 897% (to put this number in perspective, predicted guaranteed severance pay for incoming female CEOs
is 1.0 million in non-declining firms and 12.8 million in declining firms). In firms where the prior CEO was dismissed
early, incoming female CEOs’ guaranteed severance pay increases by 123% (model 4). For a one standard deviation
increase in the proportion of female CEOs in the firm’s industry, incoming female CEOs’ guaranteed severance pay
decreases by 40%, and by 91% in firms with female directors (models 5 and 6, respectively).
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Supplemental Analyses
Gender-Based Difference in Severance by Termination Event. While our empirical analysis examined severance
agreements in the case of involuntary termination, an analysis of proxy statements (DEF 14A) reveals that severance
agreements are negotiated for a number of other involuntary and voluntary termination events beyond involuntary
termination, namely: 1) voluntary retirement, 2) resignation without good reason, 3) voluntary termination for good
reason, 4) involuntary termination without cause, and 5) involuntary termination with cause. Voluntary retirement and
resignation without good reason occurs when CEOs either retire or leave on their own volition, and voluntary
termination with good reason occurs in response to changes in employment terms, e.g. relocation of headquarters
(Bodolica & Spraggon, 2009: 988). Involuntary termination is often triggered by unsatisfactory performance, while
involuntary termination with cause is generally defined by events such as felony, fraud, embezzlement, neglect of
duties, or violation of non-compete provisions (Schwab & Thomas, 2006). If female executives perceive greater
vulnerability to termination in a CEO role due to downwardly biased evaluations, then incoming female CEOs should
only have higher guaranteed severance pay than male CEOs for termination events which are performance-related and
outside the control of the CEO. The only event that falls into this category is involuntary termination.
To explore this, we hand-collected the guaranteed severance dollar values for all five termination events listed above
from Fortune 500 and S&P 500 firms’ proxy statements. Due to the arduous and time-consuming task of hand coding
proxy data, we collected this data from 2010, which falls in the middle of our sample time frame.10 We then regressed
the logged value of guaranteed severance pay for each termination event on the female dummy variable and all the
controls included in the main analysis at the time of appointment (resulting in 320 observations). As seen in Appendix
A, the guaranteed severance pay of female CEOs is larger than male CEOs for involuntary termination, and
involuntary termination only (b = 4.60, p = 0.033). Thus, these results provide additional support that female
candidates perceive greater involuntary termination vulnerability in CEO roles than male candidates.
Endogeneity Checks. Next, we wanted to examine how strong a correlated omitted variable would need to be to
overturn our results by calculating the impact threshold of a confounding variable (ITCV) for our main model (Frank,
2000). We find that an omitted variable would have to be correlated at 0.246 with CEOs’ initial severance agreement
value and 0.246 with CEO gender to invalidate our results, corresponding to an “impact” of 0.0604. Given that the
largest impact of our observed covariates is 0.0068 based on unconditional correlations and 0.0031 based on partial
correlations, the “impact” of an omitted variable would thus need to be much larger than any of the variables that we
already included in our model. Assuming that we have a reasonable set of control variables, this suggests that the
results are likely not driven by a correlated omitted variable.
In addition, to ensure the robustness of our findings, we empirically tested that hiring a female CEO is not endogenous,
by performing a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test (cf. Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). The DWH test includes the
residuals of potentially endogenous right-hand-side variables, as a function of the instrumental variables and the
exogenous variables in a regression of the original model (Jiang et al., 2017). This test allows us to assess whether the
estimates obtained by OLS are consistent. Using the lagged number of female executives excluding the CEO as the
instrumental variable in the first regression, we found the coefficient on residuals to be nonsignificant (p = 0.646) in
the second-step regression, indicating that the endogeneity of the CEO’s gender is unlikely to be an issue.
Alternative Explanations. We performed several supplemental analyses to rule out alternative explanations for our
main finding that new female CEOs tend to have larger severance agreements than new male CEOs. First, we ran our
main models on a matched sample of incoming male CEOs. Propensity score matching ensures that the matched group
(incoming male CEOs) is as similar as possible to the treatment group (incoming female CEOs) on observable
characteristics (Amore et al., 2014). Following other studies (e.g., Amore et al., 2014; Cook & Glass, 2014), we
estimated the propensity score with firm performance, firm size, industry, and percent of female outside board
members. We then used the nearest neighbor method to obtain our matched sample of incoming male CEOs (Li, 2012)
and ran the same models as presented in model 2 of table 2. Matching on five males for each female CEO (n = 244),
we find no material differences between this analysis and our main model (b = 1.82, p = 0.014). These results are
displayed in Appendix B. Thus, gender-based sorting does not appear to explain our results.
Second, it could be that male and female CEOs receive very different compensation contracts, so that the effect of
gender differences in severance agreements in facilitating female CEO appointments might be overstated. To
investigate this possibility, we examined whether incoming female CEOs’ pay structures were composed of lower
levels of “at risk” pay than incoming male CEOs’. We also explored whether differences in total pay or cash-based
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pay existed. To do so, we ran regressions similar to those presented in model 2 of table 2, using the ratio of variable
pay to total pay (defined as stock, stock options, and non-equity incentive pay divided by the total of salary, bonus,
stock, stock options, non-equity incentive pay, deferred compensation earnings, and other compensation), total annual
pay, the value of yearly stock options, and salary, as the dependent variables.11 As seen in Appendix B, we do not find
gender differences for the proportion of variable pay (b = 0.00, p = 0.782), total annual pay (b = 0.03, p = 0.725), stock
option value (b = -0.97, p = 0.356), or salary (b = -0.19, p = 0.535). These results indicate that the total amount and
structure of the compensation packages of comparable male and female CEOs are statistically indistinguishable at the
time of appointment.
Last, while our theory suggests that recent organizational distress can heighten female CEO candidates’ termination
concerns, there is some evidence that women tend to be more risk averse than men (e.g., Croson & Gneezy 2009;
Eckel & Grossman, 2008, Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998), including among firm executives (Jeong & Harrison, 2017).
Thus, although we controlled for measures of firm risk (stock price volatility and leverage) in our main models, it is
possible that female CEOs are more risk averse than male CEOs, which could be driving the gender difference in the
initial severance agreements. To explore this, we studied whether stock return volatility and leverage also have a
moderating effect on the difference in severance agreements between women and men. We find that measures of firm
risk do not have a statistically significant moderating effect (b = -0.39, p = 0.554; b = 0.26, p = 0.707), as displayed
in Appendix B. Thus, typical measures of firm risk do not appear to heighten female CEO candidates’ perceptions of
termination vulnerability compared to male candidates, suggesting that our results are not driven by gender differences
in risk aversion.
Discussion
In this study, we propose that, due to inherent gender bias and male-type leadership schemas, female executives will
perceive heightened termination vulnerability when considering a CEO role. We further theorize that certain
contingencies will heighten or alleviate women’s termination concerns. Specifically, we argue that indicators of recent
organizational distress should heighten female candidates’ perceptions of bias in CEO roles, and thus, further increase
their termination concerns. In contrast, the presence of female leaders is likely to decrease their perceptions of bias,
and thus attenuate those concerns. Our results support our arguments and, thus, have both theoretical and practical
implications.
First, our findings contribute to a recent literature that studies the factors that affect the appointment of female CEOs
(Cook & Glass, 2014; Zhang & Qu, 2016). Specifically, we find that incoming female CEOs receive larger severance
agreements than incoming male CEOs, or a “gender severance gap” in favor of female CEO candidates. On its own,
this result contributes to the gender gap literature, which typically documents “gaps” in favor of men (Bertrand &
Hallock, 2001; Blau & Kahn, 2017; Joshi, Son, & Hoh, 2015). More broadly, this result supports our argument that
women perceive greater termination vulnerability than men when considering CEO roles – thus, the advantageous
gender gap in severance agreements emanates from an initial disadvantage. This has important implications for
corporate governance and recruiting. In particular, although prior literature has argued that severance agreements can
function as a recruitment tool (Rau & Xu, 2013; Cowen et al., 2016), empirical work has yet to provide support for
this argument (Klein et al., 2017). Consistent with gender and UE research, female leaders’ heightened termination
concerns likely lead some women to “opt-out” from assuming executive roles. Although severance agreements cannot
reduce women’s perceptions of termination vulnerability, they can insure against termination losses, and thus, at least
partly mitigate female CEO candidates’ termination concerns. Thus, we argue that more valuable severance
agreements can be particularly useful in the recruitment of female executive candidates.
We further show that the magnitude of the difference in severance agreements between incoming female and male
CEOs appears to vary with factors affecting female candidates’ perceptions of termination vulnerability in CEO roles.
Specifically, we find that this difference is larger in organizations on a declining performance trend or where the prior
CEO was dismissed early, and smaller in firms with at least one female director or that operate in industries with more
female CEOs. These findings provide some preliminary evidence about the specific conditions that seem to exacerbate
and alleviate women’s perceptions of biased treatment, rather than simply insuring them against termination losses as
severance agreements do.
We also show in our supplemental analyses that the structure and total annual compensation of new female and male
CEOs are statistically undistinguishable, which stands in contrast with our finding that female CEOs do receive more
valuable initial severance agreements than men. While a large literature indicates that women face greater challenges
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in top executive roles than men (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Park & Westphal, 2013), the findings in this paper suggest that
these challenges may actually give women an advantage when bargaining with boards, which has not yet been
recognized by prior research. Indeed, scholars and the media have been paying more attention to the biases and
challenges faced by women in top leadership positions (Dixon-Fowler, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 2013), and to the fact
that women are rarely appointed as CEOs (Catalyst, 2018). As a result, some boards may already be very attuned to
the concerns of women considering CEO roles and offering higher levels of guaranteed severance pay to female
candidates, relative to male candidates, to encourage them to accept those roles. Specifically, when both the board and
the CEO candidate are aware of the greater obstacles faced by a CEO because of her gender, a female CEO candidate
is likely to be more credible at the negotiation stage when she asks for a more generous severance agreement – the
board might be less receptive to similar demands formulated by a male CEO candidate. Nevertheless, to better
understand the drivers of the difference in severance agreements between women and men, future research could
develop a better understanding of the negotiation process between CEO candidates and the board, for example by
using experiments, surveys of female and male CEOs, and/or interviews with boards of directors, compensation
consultants, and CEO candidates.
Relatedly, although we do not find statistically significant differences between incoming male and female CEOs for
standard forms of compensation, we believe that addressing how CEOs may trade-off severance against other forms
of compensation, or other aspects of the employment contract, would also be beneficial for pushing research on
severance agreements forward. For example, it is possible that some CEOs forgo pension benefits and perquisites in
order to enhance their contractual severance payment when negotiating their employment contract. An alternative
hypothesis advanced by Bebchuk and Fried (2004) is that some CEOs will attempt to extract more benefits from the
firm by “camouflaging” their compensation into items not reflected in their “annual compensation” – in which case
they will obtain more generous severance agreements as well as additional benefits. Additional research is needed to
explore this question, as well as if, and how, men and women trade-off compensation in different ways.
Consistent with our theory, the fear of biased treatment leads female candidates to perceive greater termination
vulnerability from accepting CEO roles than their male counterparts. This is not only because they perceive they will
likely face more negative reactions to their appointment than will male CEOs (Jeong & Harrison, 2017; Lee & James,
2007), but also because they expect biased evaluations of their actions over time (Gupta et al., 2018; Park & Westphal,
2013). Given that these concerns are inextricably linked, we argue female CEO candidates will be more likely to
require severance agreements to accept CEO roles than their male counterparts. However, although boards may
perceive severance as a recruitment tool, they may also view severance as a tool for aligning CEOs’ interests with
those of shareholders post-appointment (Almazan & Suarez, 2003; Cadman et al., 2016). This raises an interesting
question of if and/or how boards’ interest alignment concerns may influence incumbent CEOs’ severance values
throughout their tenures, and further, whether gender-related severance gaps persist over time (Klein et al., 2017).
Although this question is beyond the scope of this study, examining the factors that may affect CEOs’ postappointment severance values and gender-related severance gaps offer interesting avenues for scholars to pursue.
As discussed above, we also found that factors that increase women’s expectations of bias in CEO roles, namely recent
organizational distress, heighten the difference in severance between incoming male and female CEOs. Interestingly,
our theory and our empirical findings also suggest that female CEOs are not merely more averse than men to adverse
circumstances such as a declining firm performance when considering a CEO position. Instead, our findings indicate
that male CEOs tend not to get more valuable severance agreements when appointed to firms with a declining
performance, or to firms where the previous CEO was prematurely dismissed, as evidenced by the non-significant
main effect of declining firm performance and prior CEO dismissal in Table 2, model 7. To the extent that severance
agreements reflect termination concerns, men seem to be unfazed by these adverse circumstances. This may seem
somewhat surprising in light of conventional arguments, but consistent with our role congruity perspective. This subset
of findings is also consistent with prior work showing that male executives are often more overconfident than female
executives (Barber & Odean, 2001; Huang & Kisgen, 2013). Future research could build on our findings by continuing
to uncover situations in which male CEOs and female CEOs may interpret stimuli differently, and further explore if
there are situations where male CEOs perceive greater termination vulnerability than female CEOs.
Further, as explained above, neither our theoretical arguments nor our empirical results indicate that the presence of
female leaders at their current levels affect men’s termination concerns. This might however be different if women
were as dominant as men currently are in firms’ upper echelons. It is thus an open question if, and at what point, men’s
termination concerns begin to change as women occupy more and more upper echelon roles, to such an extent that
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gender roles are redefined. This does not imply that female leaders are systematically at a disadvantage nowadays:
studies referenced in Eagly and colleagues (1995) have found that female leaders tend to be viewed as more effective
than male leaders in educational, governmental, and social service organizations, as leader roles have a more feminine
definition in these organizations. Thus, it seems that female CEOs could be at an advantage in corporations that
resemble nonprofit organizations along some dimensions, including the gender makeup. Admittedly, it is arduous to
measure such differences, even though more qualitative studies might be able to capture them – scholars have argued
that for-profit and nonprofit organizations are more similar than is often believed (e.g., Brody, 1996). We believe this
question provides a fruitful opportunity for additional research designed for developing a deeper understanding of
female and male CEOs’ termination concerns in different types of organizations and among various industries with
different gendered leadership concentrations.
Finally, although we theorize and show evidence consistent with the notion that the presence of other female leaders
plays an important role in allaying the concerns that women may have about experiencing biased treatment in CEO
roles, we do not address the policies and practices that can lead to a greater presence of female leaders. Other research,
however, provides guidance on this important issue. For instance, some have argued that gender quotas for top
management teams and boards may help to “break the structures that endogenously favor the inequality” (Kogut,
Colomer, & Belinky, 2014: 892). Thus, quotas, which mandate a target for a certain group, can help achieve a critical
mass of female corporate leaders (Kogut et al., 2014). Accordingly, several European countries have adopted gender
quotas for corporate boards. For example, Germany recently passed legislation requiring firms to raise the percentage
of women on the board of directors to 30 percent (Smale & Miller, 2015). Similar legal requirements are in effect in
Norway, Spain, France, Belgium, Italy, Iceland, and the Netherlands. We contribute to this debate by showing that
increasing female leader representation may lower women’s concerns about biased treatment in CEO roles. Yet,
additional research is needed to explore the consequences of quotas and other ways to increase the presence of women
in upper echelon roles. In addition, the aforementioned countries could provide an interesting context to understand
if, and how, men’s concerns change as the presence of female leaders increases in firms’ upper echelons. Last, prior
work has argued that directors’ experience or familiarity with certain events can influence the type of events to which
they pay attention and their evaluations of such events (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). Thus, it is possible that
women’s termination concerns will also be mitigated in firms where directors have prior experience working with a
female CEO in their own ‘home firms’, or at other firms where they are also directors. This “familiarity hypothesis”
could also be explored in future studies.
Conclusion
Severance payments are often viewed as a pernicious form of rent extraction or even insurance for incompetence
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Dalton, Daily, & Kesner, 1993; Morrison, 1982). This paper contributes to a literature that
argues that firms may benefit from the use of severance agreements in certain situations. Specifically, our findings
suggest that severance agreements, which insure CEOs against involuntary termination, play an important role in the
appointments of female CEOs. We identified two important factors—declining firm performance and the early
dismissal of a previous CEO—that heighten female CEO candidates’ concerns regarding a CEO role. We also
identified two factors—the presence of female CEOs in the focal firm’s industry and the presence of female directors
on its board—that alleviate their concerns. We have argued that these factors affect women’s perceptions of biased
treatment in CEO roles. We hope our findings help provide a stronger foundation on which scholars can build, to
provide a deeper theoretical and empirical understanding of the factors that enhance or reduce female executives’
proclivity to pursue and accept top leadership roles.
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5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

Notes
Because initial severance agreements are negotiated before a CEO is employed and starts managing the
company, they are not based on the actual compensation and employment risk faced by CEOs, but
instead they reflect the perceptions about this risk at the contract negotiation stage.
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this idea.
Stock options plans oftentimes stipulate that, for dismissed executives, the exercise period for vested
stock-options will be shortened, and that unvested options will only vest partially or be lost (Greenhalgh,
2015).
In addition, when entering less male-dominated industry, female CEOs may even perceive greater
alternative future employment opportunities should they be dismissed.
We focus on female director presence rather than the number or proportion of female directors given we
believe it is the presence of female directors that plays an important role in mitigating female CEO
candidates’ termination concerns. As a female CEO, being appointed to a firm with only male directors
is very different from being appointed to a firm with some female directors. While the presence of a
woman on the board can help mitigate perceptions of biased treatment against female CEOs, the
incremental value of any additional director should be lower when it comes to mitigating the termination
concerns of female CEOs. In other words, increasing the number of female directors from zero to one is
significantly more impactful for allaying female candidates’ termination concerns than any subsequent
incremental increase. Several related studies, such as Geiler and Renneboog (2015), Gagliarducci and
Paserman (2012), and Zhang and Qu, 2016, support the idea that the presence rather the number of
female evaluators matters.
There are no material differences to the results presented in the paper with the inclusion of a dummy
variable indicating before (or after) the financial recession.
In a reference paper on using clustering as an alternative to dummy variables with panel data, Petersen
(2009) argued that with insufficient clusters along one dimension (say, years), it is best to cluster along
one dimension only (say, industry) and use dummy variables on the other dimension (475): "When both
a firm and a time effect are present in the data, researchers can address one parametrically (e.g., by
including time dummies) and then estimate standard errors clustered on the other dimension."
This moderator is still significant if we define it as the early dismissal of a prior male CEO as in Zhang
and Qu (2016).
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10. Similar to past severance studies (e.g. Goldman & Huang, 2015; Yermack, 2006), we began with Fortune
500 and S&P 500 firms and dropped all non-public firms and all firms not covered by Execucomp. We
obtained each firm’s proxy statement, filed in 2010 or 2011 depending on the date of their Annual
Shareholder Meeting, from the SEC website. We then searched for guaranteed severance pay
information for each CEO and coded the total dollar value of guaranteed severance pay for each
termination event reported.
11. However, instead of including total pay as a control, in each model we included a control for total pay
minus the dependent variable, or in the case of examining gender differences in total pay, left out this
control.
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[0.972]
4.
Early dismissed prior CEO
0.13
0.34
-0.04
0.02
-0.01
-[0.190]
[0.645]
[0.869]
5.
Female CEOs in industry [lagged]
0.00
1.00
0.05
0.07
0.02
0.04
-[0.164]
[0.050]
[0.488]
[0.193]
6.
Female director presence [lagged]
0.74
0.44
0.04
0.02
-0.03
0.02
0.11
[0.241]
[0.546]
[0.305]
[0.513]
[0.001]
7.
Return volatility [lagged]
0.44
0.29
-0.04
-0.04
0.08
0.10
-0.03
[0.289]
[0.257]
[0.012]
[0.003]
[0.451]
8.
Leverage [lagged]
0.56
0.21
-0.01
-0.01
0.02
-0.01
0.05
[0.752]
[0.720]
[0.545]
[0.721]
[0.136]
9.
Firm performance [lagged]
0.13
1.32
0.01
0.10
-0.02
-0.06
0.17
[0.703]
[0.003]
[0.588]
[0.061]
[0.000]
10.
Industry firm performance [lagged]
0.08
0.51
0.01
-0.03
0.00
0.02
0.10
[0.685]
[0.363]
[0.998]
[0.567]
[0.002]
11.
Shareholder return [lagged]
0.07
0.40
0.10
0.03
-0.07
-0.11
0.00
[0.003]
[0.460]
[0.045]
[0.001]
[0.904]
12.
Firm size [lagged]
21.63
1.57
0.07
0.02
0.00
-0.04
0.05
[0.040]
[0.469]
[0.959]
[0.295]
[0.109]
13.
Board independence [lagged]
0.79
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0.12
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0.63
0.48
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[0.312]
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TABLE 2
OLS Models Predicting Initial Guaranteed Severance Pay
Independent variable
Female

Model 1

Model 2
2.28
(0.63)
[0.001]

Model 3
1.84
(0.77)
[0.020]
3.43
(1.09)
[0.003]

Female x declining firm performance

Female x early dismissal of prior CEO

Model 4
1.98
(0.70)
[0.006]

Model 5
2.52
(0.62)
[0.000]

1.97
(1.18)
[0.099]

Female x female CEOs in industry

-0.89
(0.41)
[0.033]

Female x female director presence

Declining firm performance

Model 6
4.10
(0.79)
[0.000]

-0.94
(0.79)
[0.243]
-0.99
(0.67)
[0.146]
0.35
(0.27)
[0.194]
-0.18
(0.53)
[0.728]
0.02
0.92
[0.986]
-0.88
(0.94)
[0.351]
0.00
(0.18)
[0.990]
0.09
(0.45)
[0.837]
1.09
(0.52)
[0.041]
-0.21
(0.17)
[0.241]
5.86
(2.55)
[0.025]
-0.86
(0.45)
[0.059]
0.04
(0.02)
[0.073]
1.44
(0.49)
[0.005]
-1.13
(0.48)
[0.023]
-0.05
(0.32)
[0.883]
-11.51
(5.41)
[0.038]
0.089

-0.95
-1.13
-0.95
(0.78)
(0.80)
(0.78)
[0.229]
[0.159]
[0.226]
Early dismissal of prior CEO
-1.05
-1.05
-1.17
(0.67)
(0.67)
(0.72)
[0.122]
[0.121]
[0.110]
Female CEOs in industry
0.32
0.32
0.32
(0.26)
(0.26)
(0.26)
[0.226]
[0.232]
[0.231]
Female director presence
-0.18
-0.19
-0.17
(0.53)
(0.53)
(0.53)
[0.736]
[0.722]
[0.743]
Return volatility
0.04
0.02
0.04
(0.90)
(0.89)
(0.90)
[0.960]
[0.978]
[0.964]
Leverage
-0.83
-0.84
-0.78
(0.94)
(0.94)
(0.94)
[0.380]
[0.375]
[0.409]
Firm performance
-0.05
-0.04
-0.04
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.16)
[0.753]
[0.799]
[0.802]
Industry firm performance
0.20
0.18
0.17
(0.41)
(0.41)
(0.43)
[0.632]
[0.670]
[0.686]
Shareholder return
1.05
1.04
1.06
(0.52)
(0.52)
(0.52)
[0.047]
[0.051]
[0.046]
Firm size
-0.21
-0.20
-0.22
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.17)
[0.231]
[0.243]
[0.216]
Board independence
5.91
5.88
5.90
(2.58)
(2.58)
(2.57)
[0.025]
[0.026]
[0.025]
Internal appointee
-0.89
-0.90
-0.89
(0.45)
(0.44)
(0.45)
[0.051]
[0.047]
[0.054]
CEO age
0.05
0.05
0.05
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
[0.068]
[0.069]
[0.063]
CEO compensation
1.44
1.43
1.43
(0.50)
(0.49)
(0.50)
[0.005]
[0.005]
[0.006]
CEO duality
-1.10
-1.07
-1.10
(0.49)
(0.49)
(0.49)
[0.028]
[0.031]
[0.029]
CEO ownership
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
(0.32)
(0.32)
(0.32)
[0.964]
[0.963]
[0.969]
Constant
-11.71
-11.77
-11.54
(5.63)
(5.64)
(5.69)
[0.042]
[0.041]
[0.047]
R-squared
0.094
0.095
0.095
Change in model (F) over model 1
13.12
9.85
2.81
[0.001]
[0.003]
[0.099]
Note: N = 870. Estimated coefficients are in bold. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.
All models include clustering for industry and year dummies.
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-0.95
(0.78)
[0.231]
-1.05
(0.67)
[0.122]
0.38
(0.27)
[0.167]
-0.17
(0.53)
[0.742]
0.06
(0.91)
[0.945]
-0.91
(0.94)
[0.339]
-0.07
(0.15)
[0.637]
0.19
(0.41)
[0.650]
1.03
(0.52)
[0.052]
-0.21
(0.17)
[0.231]
5.97
(2.58)
[0.024]
-0.89
(0.45)
[0.051]
0.05
(0.02)
[0.061]
1.43
(0.49)
[0.005]
-1.10
(0.49)
[0.030]
-0.02
(0.32)
[0.946]
-11.65
(5.65)
[0.044]
0.095
4.79
[0.033]

-2.35
(1.07)
[0.033]
-0.93
(0.79)
[0.242]
-1.03
(0.67)
[0.126]
0.32
(0.26)
[0.226]
-0.08
(0.55)
[0.886]
0.06
(0.91)
[0.944]
-0.82
(0.94)
[0.387]
-0.03
(0.16)
[0.829]
0.16
(0.40)
[0.686]
1.06
(0.52)
[0.044]
-0.20
(0.17)
[0.239]
6.12
(2.63)
[0.024]
-0.87
(0.44)
[0.055]
0.05
(0.02)
[0.070]
1.43
(0.49)
[0.005]
-1.12
(0.49)
[0.027]
-0.01
(0.32)
[0.980]
-11.90
(5.59)
[0.038]
0.095
4.79
[0.033]

Model 7
3.52
(0.57)
[0.000]
3.67
(1.15)
[0.002]
2.50
(1.21)
[0.044]
-0.93
(0.40)
[0.025]
-2.38
(1.03)
[0.024]
-1.13
(0.80)
[0.164]
-1.19
(0.72)
[0.104]
0.37
(0.28)
[0.181]
-0.08
(0.56)
[0.886]
0.06
(0.92)
[0.951]
-0.83
(0.93)
[0.375]
-0.04
(0.16)
[0.822]
0.11
(0.45)
[0.812]
1.04
(0.52)
[0.052]
-0.21
(0.17)
[0.234]
6.14
(2.63)
[0.023]
-0.88
(0.45)
[0.054]
0.05
(0.02)
[0.059]
1.41
(0.49)
[0.006]
-1.07
(0.49)
[0.034]
-0.01
(0.32)
[0.965]
-11.68
(5.69)
[0.045]
0.098
5.84
[0.001]
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APPENDIX A
OLS Models Predicting Guaranteed Severance Pay by Termination Event, 2010
Involuntary
Voluntary
termination without
Independent variable
Retirement
Resignation
termination
cause
Female
0.10
-0.75
2.92
4.60
(3.42)
(0.31)
(2.35)
(2.10)
[0.977]
[0.019]
[0.219]
[0.033]
R-squared
0.113
0.078
0.078
0.081
Note: N = 320. Includes all controls (at time of appointment) from main models. Estimated coefficients are
in bold. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values are in brackets. All models also include clustering
for industry.

Independent variable
Female

APPENDIX B
OLS Models Testing Alternative Explanations
Matched male
sample
CEO compensation
DV = Initial
DV = Ratio of
DV =
DV = Option
severance
variable pay
Total pay
value
1.82
0.00
0.03
-0.97
(0.71)
(0.01)
(0.08)
(1.04)
[0.014]
[0.782]
[0.725]
[0.356]

Involuntary
termination for cause
0.21
(1.74)
[0.905]
0.070

DV = Salary
-0.19
(0.30)
[0.535]

Female x return volatility

Female x leverage

Observations
244
870
870
870
R-squared
0.247
0.657
0.348
0.069
Note: Includes all controls used in main models. Estimated coefficients are in bold. Standard errors in parentheses.
P-values are in brackets. All models also include clustering for industry and year dummies. All tests are two-tailed.
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870
0.150

Firm risk
interactions
DV = Initial
severance
2.23
(0.66)
[0.001]
-0.39
(0.66)
[0.554]
0.26
(0.68)
[0.707]
870
0.094

